

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5741

INFO DOD WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 NASSAU 1177

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR BF US

SUBJ: FACILITIES TALKS: ADDERLEY TALKS MAXIMAL

REF: NASSAU 1176

BEGIN SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR AND EMBOFF MET WITH GCOB MINEXTAFF ADDERLEY AND PERMSEC RUSSELL AFTERNOON JUNE 28 AT LATTER'S REQUEST TO DISCUSS FACILITIES TALKS. AFTER PROPOSING NEW TARGET DATE OF DECEMBER 31 FOR CONCLUSION OF DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT (REFTEL), ADDERLEY GOT TO MEAT OF MEETING, WHICH WAS STATEMENT OF BAHAMIAN VIEWS ON ENTIRE ISSUE OF WHERE TALKS SHOULD LEAD. GCOB APPEARS FINALLY TO HAVE GIVEN SOME COLLECTIVE THOUGHT TO ISSUE AND ADDERLEY PRESENTED A MAXIMAL OPENING BID FOR THE DISCUSSIONS, PROPOSING IN VAGUE TERMS CONSIDERABLE US FINANCIAL AID TO THE BAHAMAS OVER AT LEAST A TEN-YEAR PERIOD. SUCH AN OPENING POSITION HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED (SEE NASSAU 833), AND AMBASSADOR SOUGHT TO POINT UP BASIC INCONGRUITY BETWEEN SPECIFIC FACILITIES AND OPERATING RIGHTS AGREEMENT ON ONE HAND AND BAHAMIAN DESIRE FOR OVERALL US FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO BOLSTER GENERAL FRIENDLY BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP ON THE OTHER. WHILE ADDERLEY'S PRESENTATION SHOULD BE VIEWED AS AN OPENING POSITION PROPOSED BY PERSONS WHO HAVE LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION, EMBASSY BELIEVES IT SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, PRESENTS SEVERAL SIG-
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NIFICANT POINTS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION AND AT LEAST CLEARLY

STATES GCOB REJECTION OF US OFFER OF \$500,000 PER YEAR CASH.
END SUMMARY

1. ADDERLEY REFERRED TO NOTES THROUGHOUT HIS PRESENTATION AND, WHAT IS EVEN MORE UNUSUAL, HIMSELF TOOK NOTES OF AMBASSADOR'S RESPONSES. ADDERLEY BEGAN WITH REFERENCE TO TWO AGREEMENTS, ON FACILITIES AND ON OPERATING RIGHTS, AND SAID THESE WERE TWO DIFFERENT KINDS OF AGREEMENTS TO BE APPROACHED SEPARATELY. FACILITIES WAS MUCH THE EASIER TO DEAL WITH. HE NOTED WHAT MIGHT BE A "MINOR" PROBLEM RELATING TO FACILITIES DRAFT. HE SAID THAT IT APPEARED FROM PRELIMINARY GCOB STUDY OF MAPS THAT PART OF SEABED AREA SOUGHT BY USG IN REGION OF TONGUE OF THE OCEAN OFF ANDROS OVERLAPPED SEABED AREA ALREADY UNDER PRIVATE SEABED MINERAL EXPLOITATION LEASE FROM GCOB TO MARCONA ARAGONITE CONCERN. ADDERLEY SAID AREA OF OVERLAP APPEARED TO BE IN NORTHWEST CORNER OF AREA DESIRED BY USG. ADDERLEY SAID MARCONA (OCEAN ENTERPRISES) HAD NOT SHOWN ANY ACTUAL INTEREST IN THIS AREA AND PROBABLY WOULD DESIRE NEITHER TO EXPLORE OR EXPLOIT THERE DURING TERM OF ITS LEASE, AND THAT DUAL USES OF AREA WOULD PROBABLY NOT CONFLICT IN ANY EVENT, BUT THAT SOME THOUGHT SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO THIS. COMMENTING ON FACILITIES MAPS AND DESCRIPTIONS PROVIDED BY U.S., ADDERLEY SAID THAT GCOB HAD NOT REALIZED BEFOREHOW MANY SITES EXISTED UNDER THE AUTEC AEGIS, SUGGESTING THAT THE BRITISH HAD NOT TOLD THE GCOB ABOUT SOME OF THEM. (COMMENT: EMBASSY BELIEVES FULL INFORMATION ON THIS HAS BEEN AVAILABLE TO MINISTRY FOR SOME TIME, EVEN IF ADDERLEY UNAWARE OF IT.) ADDERLEY SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER ALL AUTEC SITES WERE CURRENTLY BEING USED AND WHETHER ALL WOULD CONTINUE IN USE FOR LIFE OF DEFINITIVE FACILITIES AGREEMENT.

2. TURNING TO OPERATING RIGHTS, ADDERLEY SAID THESE GAVE GCOB CONSIDERABLE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS. HE SAID THE PRESENT US DRAFT ON OPERATING RIGHTS "GOES MUCH FARTHER" THAN GCOB "COULD POSSIBLY GO" IN GRANTING U.S. RIGHTS WITHIN GCOB JURISDICTION. ADDERLEY SAID IT APPEARED THAT US DRAFT WOULD GRANT USG GREATER POWERS WITHIN THE BAHAMAS THAN THE USG HAS WITHIN ITS OWN FIFTY STATES. HE SAID CONCEPT OF OPERATING RIGHTS IMMEDIATELY RAISES THE QUESTION "OPERATING RIGHTS OVER WHAT, I.E., WHERE?" REAL ISSUE IS MOVEMENT OF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT AND THIS ENTAILS

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THE EXTENT OF BAHAMIAN TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, "AND THUS WE GET TO THE ARCHIPELAGO." ADDERLEY SAID HE COULD NOT SEE HOW WE COULD DECIDE ON OPERATING RIGHTS WITHOUT COMING TO AGREEMENT ON PRECISELY (NOT VAGUELY) WHAT THE JURISDICTIONAL AREA IN WHICH OPERATING RIGHTS ARE EXERCISED IS (SUCH FORMULATIONS AS "AREA UNDER BAHAMIAN JURISDICTION" -- WITH GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT TO LEAVE CONTENT OF THAT PHRASE VAGUE -- WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT, HE SUGGESTED). ADDERLEY STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT

THE GCOB WISHES TO ACCOMMODATE US INTERESTS IN THIS AREA "AS MUCH AS WE CAN."

3. WHILE STATING THAT TWO AGREEMENTS ARE DIFFERENT IN KIND, ADDERLEY SAID THAT THEY PROBABLY WOULD HAVE SOME FEATURES IN COMMON, GIVING AS AN EXAMPLE COMMON TERMINATION DATES. IN THIS RESPECT HE SAID IT APPEARED TO GCOB THAT 15 YEARS WAS TOO LONG A PERIOD OF VALIDITY FOR EITHER AGREEMENT AND THAT 10 YEARS SEEMED MORE REASONABLE. ADDERLEY SAID THAT THIS PREFERENCE FOR A 10-YEAR TERM HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH FACT THAT ORIGINAL AUTECH LEASE DUE TO EXPIRE IN 1983, AND WOULD BE PREFERABLE IN ANY CASE. AT SAME TIME, HE SAID GCOB WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OPTION-TO-RENEW CLAUSE, CALLING FOR RENEWAL ON TERMS TO BE NEGOTIABLE AT END OF TEN YEARS OR BEFORE. IF AGREEMENT IS ACCEPTABLE, ADDERLEY SUGGESTED LATER, THERE IS NO REASON IT SHOULD BE NOT A "LIFETIME" AGREEMENT, RENEWABLE EVERY TEN YEARS.
SPIERS

NOTE BY OCT: DISSEMINATION COORDINATED WITH MR. TWOHIE S/S-O.

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4. ADDERLEY SAID MOST IMPORTANT POINT HE HAD TO MAKE WAS INDICATION OF HOW GCOB "VIEWS THE MATERIAL CONSIDERATION" FOR ENTERING INTO DEFINITIVE AGREEMENTS, I.E. THE QUID. HE CHARACTERIZED PREVIOUS US QUID OFFER AS "NEBULOUS" AND SAID THAT CERTAIN ITEMS, SUCH AS SPONSORING UN, OAS (OR EVEN NATO) MEMBERSHIP, WERE OF LITTLE INTEREST TO THE GCOB NOW.

ADDERLEY SAID KEY TO WHOLE ISSUE OF FACILITIES TALKS WAS HOW VALUABLE FACILITIES AND OPERATING RIGHTS ARE TO THE US. GCOB DOES NOT KNOW THIS AND WILL NOT PRESS U.S. TO REVEAL IT. WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO THE US MAY NOT BE SAME AS WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO THE GCOB, AND VICE VERSA, SO IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ADDERLEY TO INFORM AMBASSADOR OF WHAT WAS IMPORTANT TO BAHAMIAN GOVERNMENT.

5. ONE THING IMPORTANT TO GCOB, ADDERLEY SAID, WAS ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS, NOT ONLY US AND UK BUT (A) COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN, (B) "THIRD WORLD" AND (C) CUBA. COMMENT: ADDERLEY APPEARED AWARE THAT THIS WAS THE WEAKEST PORTION OF HIS PRESENTATION, AS WELL AS ONE WHICH TENDED TO CONFLICT WITH HIS PERSONAL VIEWS AS EXPRESSED PREVIOUSLY TO AMBASSADOR, AND HE MADE IT WITH LITTLE RELISH AND EVIDENCED SOME RELIEF WHEN IT WAS CONCLUDED AND AMBASSADOR ELECTED NOT TO PURSUE IT. END COMMENT. ADDERLEY SAID THAT OTHER FORMER COLONIES HAVE NOT ENTERED INTO SUCH FACILITIES OR OPERATING RIGHTS AGREEMENTS WITH THE US OR UK AND THAT "OTHER CARIBBEAN CONFIDENTIAL

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COMMONWEALTH NATIONS THINK WE'RE FOOLISH EVEN TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH YOU." HE SAID, OF THIRD WORLD DISAPPROVAL TOWARD GETTING TOO CLOSE TO MAJOR POWERS, "WE HAVE TO LIVE IN THIS (THIRD) WORLD TOO", AND THAT THE STATUS, CREDIBILITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE BAHAMAS MUST BE MAINTAINED IN SUCH EYES. ADDERLEY SUGGESTED THAT CONCLUDING DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT WITH THE US WOULD ALSO PROBABLY ADVERSELY AFFECT THE PROBLEMS THE BAHAMAS IS ALREADY HAVING IN ATTRACTING THE ATTENTION OF MULTILATERAL LENDING FORA, THE ARGUMENT BEING THAT THE BAHAMAS, WHICH HAS A RELATIVELY HIGH PER CAPITA INCOME, WOULD BE EVEN LESS SYMPATHETICALLY VIEWED IN SUCH FORA IF IT WERE CONSIDERED "A BASTARD FIFTY-FIRST STATE" OF THE US. ON CUBA, ADDERLEY SAID THAT THUS FAR IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE TO KEEP CUBA NO MORE THAN "A MINOR NUISANCE" TO THE BAHAMAS (CITING LAST WINTER'S FISHING INCIDENT) BUT THAT THE SIGNING OF A DEFINITIVE FACILITIES AGREEMENT WITH THE US MIGHT HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THIS ISSUE AS WELL.

6. THE CONCLUSION OF DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT WOULD THUS SUBJECT THE GCOB TO A VARIETY OF PROBLEMS, INCLUDING DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS, AND IT WAS TO OFFSET THESE, ADDERLEY SUGGESTED, THAT "COMPENSATION" IN SOME FORM WAS REQUIRED. HE SAID THAT WHAT SEEMS IMPORTANT TO THE US IS ITS GLOBAL POSITION AND THE DEFENSE OF ITS SECURITY INTERESTS. WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO THE GCOB IS THE DEFENSE OF THE BAHAMAS AND, MOST URGENTLY, ITS ABILITY TO "SURVIVE ECONOMICALLY". IN PARTICULAR, WHAT THE US WANTS ARE FACILITIES AND OPERATING RIGHTS IN THE BAHAMAS, "WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER FAVORABLY, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITION" WHICH PARTIES CAN DISCUSS IN DETAIL

LATER. WHAT GCOB WANTS IS ECONOMIC SECURITY AND "WHO IS BETTER ABLE TO DEAL WITH THAT" THAN THE USG?

7. AGAIN ADDERLEY SAID THAT THE ONLY REAL QUESTION IS HOW BADLY THE US WANTS WHAT IT WANTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT A CASH OFFER OF \$500,000 PER YEAR INDICATED THAT THE US WAS NOT "SERIOUS" ABOUT EITHER FACILITIES OR OPERATING RIGHTS IN THE BAHAMAS. ADDERLEY NOTED THAT THE BRITISH, WHO HE SAID "ARE ONLY ASKING FOR UNDER FIVE ACRES" WERE NOT OFFERING \$1 MILLION PER YEAR FOR TEN YEARS, WHEREAS THE US "WANTS MORE THAN 100 TIMES AS MUCH AS THE UK." ADDERLEY REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE HALF-MILLION ANNUAL FIGURE WAS UNREAL-CONFIDENTIAL

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ISTIC, SAID IT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR NEITHER SIDE TO MENTION IT AGAIN AND SUGGESTED THAT HIS FLAT REJECTION OF IT WAS PLACED IN MORE DIPLOMATIC TERMS THAN THOSE EMPLOYED BY HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES. COMMENT: ADDERLEY MENTIONED NO COUNTER-FIGURE, BUT HE LEFT NO DOUBT THAT US HAD BETTER COME UP WITH A NEW FIGURE IF FRUITFUL DISCUSSIONS ARE TO CONTINUE.

8. ADDERLEY INDICATED FOUR FORMS IN WHICH THE GCOB WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE "MATERIAL CONSIDERATION" FOR THE US. (A) CASH; (B) GRANT AID FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; (C) DEVELOPMENT BANK LOANS; AND (D) GENERAL, BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. ADDERLEY MADE QUITE CLEAR HE WAS TALKING ABOUT A BROAD PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE THAT SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF A MINIMUM 10-YEAR PERIOD RATHER THAN AS SO MUCH PER YEAR. HE SAID THAT WHAT WE NEED TO FIND IS A FORMULA FOR OVERALL US ASSISTANCE TO THE BAHAMAS. HE ADMITTED THAT EVEN IF THE US GAVE THE GCOB -100 MILLION IN CASH THE LATTER WOULDN'T KNOW HOW TO HANDLE IT BECAUSE NO "PERMANENT ECONOMIC ESTABLISHMENT" EXISTS IN THE BAHAMAS. ADDERLEY SAID IT WAS PRECISELY ON THIS NEED FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY AND THE BUILDING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS THAT THE FOCUS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP MUST REST. HE SURMISED THAT US MILITARY EXPERTS AND LEGAL DRAFTSMEN PROBABLY FAILED TO REALIZE THE ECONOMIC NECESSITIES OF THE BAHAMAS AND THE LIKELY LIABILITIES TO THE GCOB FROM SIGNING A DEFINITIVE FACILITIES AND OPERATING RIGHTS AGREEMENT WITH THE US. ECONOMIC STABILITY WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CREATE POLITICAL STABILITY, ADDERLEY WARNED.
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5743

INFO DOD WASHDC

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9. ADDERLEY SAID THAT THE GCOB WAS NOT IN THE MARKET OF MERELY SELLING THE US SPACE IN THE BAHAMAS AND DID NOT WANT THE TALKS TO TAKE PLACE IN THAT SORT OF ENVIRONMENT. ADDERLEY ADMITTED THAT US NEEDS IN THE BAHAMAS WERE FAR EASIER TO DEFINE THAN BAHAMIAN INTERESTS, AND FOR THAT REASON EASIER TO AFFIX A PRICE-TAG TO. BUT HE SAID THAT SOME OF THE THINGS THE GCOB WAS INTERESTED IN WERE AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEEP-SEA FISHING PORT AND PROCESSING POINT IN THE BAHAMAS. IN HIS ONLY CLEARLY SPECIFIC EXAMPLE, ADDERLEY SAID THAT WHEN THE USG TURNS THE AID LIVESTOCK PROJECT ON ANDROS OVER TO THE BAHAMAS ASSISTANCE MAY WELL BE REQUIRED TO CONTINUE THE PROJECT UNDER BAHAMIAN AUSPICES, AND THAT FROM FIVE TO TEN MILLION DOLLARS OF DIRECT ASSISTANCE MAY BE NECESSARY. ADDERLEY ADMITTED THAT LARGE AMOUNTS OF CAPITAL MIGHT BE REQUIRED FOR SUCH PROJECTS, BUT SOUGHT TO GIVE EXAMPLES OF "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS" THE US HAD HAD ELSEWHERE (CITING THOSE WITH MEXICO AND FOR DUTY-FREE IMPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES IN PRE-CASTRO CUBA) AND ARGUED THAT ASSISTANCE DIRECTED TO THE BAHAMAS COULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT PROVIDED ELSEWHERE SINCE VIRTUALLY ALL DOLLARS DIRECTED HERE WOULD FIND THEIR WAY BACK TO THE US.

10. WHEN ADDERLEY CAME UP FOR AIR, AMBASSADOR INDICATED "PRIVATELY" HIS VIEWS. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT ADDERLEY'S REMARKS SUGGESTED SOME CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES MIGHT ARISE. HE SAID
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THAT US VIEWED TALKS AS INVOLVING SPECIFIC FACILITIES AND

OPERATING RIGHTS. FACILITIES WERE LOCATED HERE LARGELY BY HISTORICAL ACCIDENT, THEY WERE NOT REGARDED AS HAVING IMPORTANT STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE, AND THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE HERE WOULD BE WEIGHED ON A COST-EFFECTIVE BASIS CONSIDERING THE PRICE OF RELOCATION. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT ADDERLEY, ON OTHER HAND, SEEMED TO BE DISCUSSING A GENERAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND WAS SEEKING TO HANG IT FROM A VERY THIN REED. AMBASSADOR URGED ADDERLEY TO COME UP WITH A "BILL OF PARTICULARS" OF SPECIFIC BAHAMIAN REQUIREMENTS IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TO PLACE SUCH ITEMS IN TERMS WHICH ARE INDEPENDENTLY JUSTIFIABLE, RATHER THAN SEEK TO EXPRESS THEM AS A QUID FOR AGREEMENT ON FACILITIES AND OPERATING RIGHTS. AMBASSADOR STRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT US AND GCOB SEEMED FROM ADDERLEY'S REMARKS TO BE TALKING ABOUT TWO ENTIRELY DIFFERENT THINGS.

11. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT \$500,000 PER YEAR FIGURE WAS NOT FINAL BUT INDICATED HIS PERSONAL DOUBT THAT FIGURE COULD GO MUCH BEYOND TWICE THAT, GIVEN US LEGAL AND POLICY CONSTRAINTS ON FACILITIES RENTAL. HE SAID US IS WILLING TO MAKE REASONABLE CASH PAYMENT BUT HE HOPED GCOB WOULD NOT PUT US AND UK QUIDS ON SOME SORT OF SLIDING ACREAGE SCALE. ADDERLEY INDICATED HE DID NOT WISH TO DO SO, BUT ADDED THAT \$500,000 FIGURE WAS "RIDICULOUS, NOT EVEN A STARTING POINT FOR DISCUSSION." ADDERLEY SAID THAT HE HAD "HEARD" THAT "SOMEONE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT" HAD DETERMINED THAT 25 MILLION DOLLARS WAS THE MAXIMUM PAYABLE OVER A 15-YEAR PERIOD FOR FACILITIES AND OPERATING RIGHTS AND THAT WHOEVER THOUGHT THAT FIGURE UP "OBVIOUSLY THOUGHT HE COULD PUT SOMETHING OVER ON THE BAHAMAS." COMMENT: ADDERLEY'S REFERENCE TO \$25 MILLION FIGURE SOUNDS FAMILIAR FROM BRIEFING PAPERS PREPARED LAST YEAR, BUT EMBASSY HAS NO IDEA WHERE HE GOT IT FROM -- CERTAINLY NOT FROM EMBASSY SOURCES.

12. AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT IF GCOB HAS A LIST OF ECONOMIC PRIORITIES FOR WHICH IT WANTS US ASSISTANCE AS MEANS OF STRENGTHENING OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, WHETHER IN TERMS OF EX-IM BANK LOANS, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OR ECONOMIC EXPERTISE, IT SHOULD LIST THEM IN PRECISE TERMS AND WE WOULD SUBMIT THEM TO WASHINGTON FOR EVALUATION, BUT NOT SEEK TO TIE A VAGUE DESIRE FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO THE SPECIFIC ISSUE

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OF FACILITIES. IN ANY CASE, AMBASSADOR SAID, US MUST KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE GCOB IS TALKING ABOUT AND EXACTLY WHAT IT WANTS BEFORE TALKS ABOUT ASSISTANCE IN ANY FORUM CAN PROGRESS VERY FAR.

13. ADDERLEY NOTED THAT WE SEEM TO BE IN A CHICKEN-AND-EGGS QUANDRY, SINCE GCOB WISHES TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER US IS WILLING TO DISCUSS GENERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BEFORE GCOB BEGINS TO

LIST SPECIFIC ITEMS FALLING THEREIN. AMBASSADOR AGAIN URGED
ADDERLEY TO DEVOTE SOME THOUGHT TO *I*****

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